Lack of an effective strategy and methodology for removing deficiencies in operating practices prevents most plants from achieving “world class performance.” At the many American plants that operate in reactive mode, defects and errors from poor practices typically represent more than 45% of all manufacturing problems while design and maintenance make up 50%. Overall Plant Effectiveness calculations indicate that if just 50% of the operating defects are removed, it is possible to increase capacity or reduce operating cost by around 9%.
A simple and practical approach to remove such deficiencies centers on improving “operational discipline.” This shouldn’t be confused with what is now commonly referred to as the achievement of “operational excellence” using advanced computerized control. They are, however, complementary.
A generally accepted concept is that every phase of an operation contains defects and that these defects are continually created during routine operation. However, many companies don’t confront the corollary — that only by simultaneously solving and removing the defects in all phases of the operation (including systems and people) at a faster rate than they are created will overall efficiency be improved.
“Operational inaccuracy” has much in common with lapses in safety performance. Both are driven by two primary factors — working conditions and, much more importantly, peoples’ behavior. So, for both problems, it is essential to give the individuals involved a set of model behaviors and immediate, accurate and positive feedback when either a mistake is made or an unnecessary risk is taken.
Errors can be made while a process plant operates stably, due to lapses in concentration — during “extended uneventful vigilance.” However, the potential for miscues is much higher during transient conditions at upsets, emergency shutdown or startup. The transient conditions are far more critical and should get attention first.
Service conditions during upsets frequently move well outside the normal operating envelope, often involving numerous unnecessary repairs and adjustments until things return to normal. While the safety risks of such changes generally are well managed, this is not always true for actions affecting the integrity of the equipment and when non-fatal damage occurs.
It is important to prepare for unplanned (crash) shutdowns such as those due to a sudden utility or raw-materials interruption. A well-rehearsed response should be worked out for each type of predictable spike and should include individually assigned checklists for required actions. Comprehensive training and routine drills are essential.
It is crucial to encourage everyone on the operating team to recognize and report both potential and actual deficiencies and deviations in order that patterns of weakness can be addressed. These include behaviors such as:
• not following a procedure’s sequence or erring because of poorly defined procedures;
• adding or eliminating an operating step;
• using an incorrect equipment startup or shutdown procedure;
• making mistakes because of poor labeling of equipment and illegibility of gauges;
• operating outside prescribed limits, e.g., for temperature or flow;
• being slow to locate a blockage, flow restriction, etc.;
• not reporting and fixing loops that are in manual mode, cycling or operating within 5% of their maximum;
• needing to repeatedly cancel alarms; and
• not spotting defective equipment despite noise, leakage, vibration, etc.
Dealing with such issues requires establishing formal processes and an improvement team of plant people.
Form an implementation team consisting of a facilitator/leader, an operator from each shift who has some coaching ability, plus one or two engineers or managers. Keep the following pointers in mind as you set up the team:
Anticipate — and work from the onset — to address a possible “recrimination” mindset among staff. It is crucial to keep people from feeling ambushed when a problem arises and is discussed. So, for instance, make sure observational data are kept confidential and cannot be used for any punitive purpose.
Broad participation and employee empowerment must be integral parts of this “Kiezen” like program. One helpful step is to have each shift team responsible for rewriting a part of some operating procedures. (In football parlance, they should be trying to create the perfect playbook.) If any particular team has a problem with concepts or requirements that others agree to, it needs counseling early in the program. Once the procedures are updated, the focus then turns to perfect execution of them.
The implementation team needs direct access to management without going through the “lines of authority,” because it is not unusual to find that first-line supervisors are last to grasp the concepts or accept the change.
Explain the significance of the connections between the Operational Deviation Triangle, the Reliability Defect Triangle, the Quality Deviation Triangle and the Safety Severity Triangle. For example, most people are familiar with the concept that if the base of the Safety Severity Triangle is reduced (unsafe behaviors and near misses), then the total number and severity of accidents are cut. Similarly if the number of potential and actual operating deficiencies are decreased, the size of the Operational Deviation Triangle base and the overall number and severity of damaging operating incidents will go down.
As already emphasized, a non-punitive atmosphere is crucial. Provide 50 or more carrots to one stick. Initially, focus on two areas:
1. Procedures improvement. Although not absolutely essential, consider creating a set of procedures written by average operators (with the oversight of engineers) for inexperienced or below-average operators. These procedures must be simple and pictorial and designed for easy and frequent reference (Figure 1). It’s a good idea to use a professional technical writer to put them into final, polished form. Revising and creating the procedures actually is in itself a very effective form of training.